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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case primarily presents two questions of first 
impression in this circuit relating to the interpretation of 
the Major Fraud Act of 1988 (the "Act"). See 18 U.S.C. 
S 1031 (West 1997). The Act makes it a federal crime to 
defraud the United States in connection with a government 
contract that is valued in excess of $1 million. Specifically, 
we must decide whether a defendant may be charged with 
a separate violation of the Act for each of numerous 
executions of a single fraudulent scheme, and whether 
modifications of the original government contract, each of 
which have a value of less than $1 million, are within the 
purview of the Act when the underlying government 
contract has a value in excess of $1 million. The defendants 
make other arguments relating to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the exclusion of expert testimony, whether an 
individual can be convicted of aiding and abetting a 
corporation he owns and controls, and alleged defects in 
their sentences. The district court rejected the defendants' 
arguments. We affirm as to all issues.* 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Although Judge Lewis heard argument in this case, he has been 
unable, however, to clear this written opinion because of illness. 
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I. 
 
A federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania indicted Samir K. Sain and his company, 
Advanced Environmental Consultants, Inc. ("AEC"), on 46 
counts of fraud in violation of the Act. Following trial, the 
petit jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts as to both 
defendants. The district court sentenced Sain to 37 months 
imprisonment and three years supervised release. The court 
sentenced AEC to five years probation and ordered it to pay 
a special assessment. In addition, the court ordered AEC to 
pay $597,124 in restitution, with any amount not paid by 
AEC to be paid by Sain. The defendants appealed.1 
 
II. 
 
This complex fraud case arises out of an approximately 
$7-million contract between the United States Army and 
AEC, pursuant to which AEC built, owned, and operated a 
waste-water treatment plant at the Army Depot at Tooele, 
Utah. AEC is an environmental consulting company 
headquartered in Pittsburgh and incorporated in 
Pennsylvania. Sain has a masters degree in engineering 
and several credits toward a doctorate, is a licensed 
professional engineer, and is the sole shareholder and 
president of AEC.2 It is well established that, because the 
jury returned guilty verdicts in the district court, this Court 
must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Government. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 
U.S. 60, 80 (1941); United States v. Cooper, 121 F.3d 130, 
133 (3d Cir. 1997). Following is a statement of facts which 
the jury could have found based on the trial evidence. 
 
The Army operates a depot in Tooele, Utah, at which it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction of the case pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a)(2). 
 
2. Until several days before trial, Sain claimed to hold a Ph.D. in 
engineering from the University of Pittsburgh. He made this 
representation to the Army when he bid on the contract. Just prior to 
trial and on cross-examination at trial, he admitted that he did not hold 
such a degree. 
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services tanks and other types of military vehicles. 
Sometime in the 1980s, the Army entered into a consent 
decree with the State of Utah requiring the Army to treat 
the waste water it was generating at the depot and 
releasing into the ground water. To fulfill its obligation 
under this consent decree, the Army proposed to have a 
contractor build, own, and operate a plant to treat the 
depot's waste water. After the bidding process, AEC was 
selected. On November 30, 1987, AEC entered into the 
contract with the Army. Under the contract, AEC agreed to 
construct, own, and operate an industrial waste-water 
treatment plant at the depot for the "firm fixed price" of 
approximately $4.5 million. In a firm fixed price contract, 
once the price is established by the parties, the amount 
paid to the supplier of the goods or services does not vary 
with its costs. In this case, the risk of cost overruns rested 
with AEC. The term of the contract was for one year 
followed by four one-year options. The Army exercised each 
option and the contract lasted the full five years. 
 
In the plant, AEC installed four large metal tanks called 
"adsorbers." Each of the tanks was designed to hold 
approximately 5,000 pounds of filtering carbon. Waste 
water would be pumped through the tanks with the carbon 
filtering out much of the water's pollutants. Periodically, as 
pollutants built up in the carbon, the carbon would become 
ineffective and have to be replaced. The process of replacing 
the carbon was called a "change out." The contract provided 
for two of these change outs per year at AEC's expense and 
did not specify the type of carbon to be used. 
 
After the Army and AEC entered into the contract, but 
before AEC began operating the plant, the Army modified 
the contract to incorporate the City of Tooele's water purity 
standards which were more strict than those imposed by 
the consent decree. The Army requested that AEC submit a 
cost proposal providing for the Army to reimburse AEC for 
its increased costs resulting from these stricter water purity 
standards. Ultimately, AEC submitted four cost proposals, 
none of which were approved by the Army. Instead, on April 
11, 1989, the Army unilaterally imposed a modification of 
the contract pursuant to which AEC would receive 
approximately $682,000 in addition to the original contract 
price. 
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In the spring of 1989, before the Army had acted on 
AEC's fourth cost proposal, AEC claimed that the waste 
water generated by the Army consistently contained a 
higher level of pollutants than the amounts specified in the 
contract. According to AEC, this higher level of pollutants 
required more than the two carbon change outs per year 
allowed by the contract. In an attempt to recoup these 
additional costs, AEC began submitting claims to the Army 
for reimbursement for costs associated with the additional 
change outs. On May 5, 1989, May 26, 1989, and June 20, 
1989, AEC submitted claims. Each claim was for $27,500 
and purported to represent the costs associated with a 
complete change out of the four tanks plus a 10-percent 
profit for AEC. According to the claims, AEC installed 5,000 
pounds of carbon in each of the four tanks at a cost of 
$1.25 per pound of carbon, a price which corresponded to 
the market price for virgin carbon. 
 
The Army agreed that these changed conditions 
warranted an equitable adjustment of the contract to 
compensate AEC for the costs of some of the additional 
carbon change outs. Lieutenant Colonel K. L. Andrews, the 
Army officer responsible for administering the AEC contract 
during most of the relevant time, notified Sain in a letter 
dated April 25, 1989 that no money would be paid to AEC 
by the Army for the additional carbon change outs unless 
AEC first submitted "documentation necessary to support a 
claim." Andrews advised that such documentation include 
"cost invoices, time sheets, and any other [necessary] 
documentation." Also, at trial, Andrews testified that, in 
addition to the notification letter, he told Sain numerous 
times that supporting documentation was required in order 
for AEC to receive payment. At trial, Sain reluctantly 
conceded that Andrews had required this documentation. 
 
According to the testimony of Andrews and Robert 
Kinsinger, the Army's technical representative at the waste- 
water plant, prior to agreeing to reimburse AEC for the 
additional change outs, Sain insisted to them that the 
heavy pollutant levels in the waste water required the use 
of virgin carbon, a more expensive type of carbon than 
reactivated carbon.3 Sain also insisted that 5,000 pounds of 
this carbon per tank, or 20,000 pounds total, must be used 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Virgin carbon has not been previously used in water purification. 
Reactivated carbon has been previously used to filter water and heated 
to high temperatures in order to rid the carbon of the impurities and re- 
open its pores. 
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in each change out. 
 
To substantiate the initial costs associated with the 
additional change outs, Sain submitted to the Army a copy 
of an invoice numbered "326" and dated January 9, 1989 
which purported to show that AEC had purchased 100,000 
pounds of carbon from a company called Encotech for 
$1.25 per pound. This price corresponded to the market 
price for virgin carbon and included a charge for 
installation. Sain also submitted to the Army a September 
5, 1989 letter on Encotech letterhead which stated that 
AEC had previously purchased the 100,000 pounds of 
carbon for the price stated in invoice number 326. 
 
It is undisputed that the invoice and letter were false. 
Both Sain and Encotech's owner, Bernard Lalli, testified 
that the carbon order had been canceled on January 15, 
1989 and that the carbon was not delivered. Sain also 
admitted "whiting out" the portion of the original invoice 
which contained a notation that the order had been 
canceled and that he had assisted Lalli in drafting the 
September 5 letter. Sain claimed that the invoice 
represented future costs. Sain had, however, purchased 
some carbon from Encotech during this time, although it 
was not virgin carbon. AEC initially ordered 50,000 pounds 
of virgin carbon at $1.18 per pound. AEC never took 
delivery of this virgin carbon. Instead, Sain asked Lalli to 
substitute 100,000 pounds of the less expensive, 
reactivated carbon, which Lalli did for a price of $.59 per 
pound. On other occasions, Sain similarly represented to 
the Army that he had purchased virgin carbon. He did not 
take delivery of this carbon and substituted cheaper, 
reactivated carbon without informing Army officials. 
 
Based on Sain's representations regarding the price of 
the carbon used in the additional change outs, the Army 
agreed to reimburse AEC $1.2455 per pound of carbon for 
the 20,000 pounds used per change out, plus 10-percent 
profit for a total of $27,401 per change out. AEC and the 
Army memorialized this agreement in Contract Modification 
14 which reimbursed AEC for the three claims previously 
submitted. In part, the modification stated: "The costs 
associated with this claim are a replacement of 60,000 lbs. 
of virgin carbon (3 change outs/20,000 lbs. per change) 
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and the labor and fees involved. ... All other terms and 
conditions in the contract remain the same." Sain 
acknowledged on cross-examination that he understood the 
purpose of the modification was to reimburse him for the 
three change outs using 60,000 pounds of virgin carbon. 
 
Sain made an additional 43 claims for reimbursement for 
costs associated with the additional carbon change outs. To 
support these claims, he submitted false and canceled 
supplier invoices. He concealed from the Army invoices 
showing the purchase of reactivated carbon, and he falsely 
certified that AEC had used 20,000 pounds of virgin carbon 
per change out when, in fact, it had not done so. In 
connection with Contract Modification 20, which covered 
the six claims following the original three, Sain submitted 
a purchase order from Encotech which showed the 
purchase of 100,000 pounds of virgin carbon for $99,000 
and a copy of a $99,000 check from an AEC checking 
account. Sain, however, canceled the invoice, voided the 
check, and never took delivery of this carbon. He also 
included in the supporting documentation an invoice for 
25,000 pounds of virgin carbon priced at $1.18 per pound 
which AEC never received. Instead, AEC substituted 50,000 
pounds of reactivated carbon. He also admitted to failing to 
submit documentation showing that he had used 
reactivated carbon. 
 
Sain supported an additional 10 of the claims by using 
checks and purchase orders relating to a different supplier, 
Water Equipment Supply ("WES"), which was a sole 
proprietorship that Sain created. WES had no operations or 
employees. Sain instructed Lalli to bill WES for reactivated 
carbon that Encotech had shipped to AEC. WES then billed 
AEC for the carbon at highly inflated prices, misdescribing 
the carbon in the invoice. In these transactions, WES 
purchased 155,768 pounds of reactivated carbon from 
Encotech at prices ranging from $.32 to $.50 per pound. 
WES then billed AEC for 238,000 pounds of carbon at $.93 
per pound and for another 100,000 at $.87 per pound. AEC 
paid these amounts to WES, but WES transferred the funds 
back to AEC and Sain. Sain instructed an AEC employee to 
describe the carbon on the WES invoices as "Iodine 1000 
and up 10/40(v)." "Iodine 1000" refers to the density of the 
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carbon. The iodine level of carbon is determined by a 
standardized test. Reactivated carbon of this iodine level 
would have been very expensive and very rare. The carbon 
provided by Encotech did not have this high iodine number 
when supplied to AEC and the standard test had not been 
performed on it, although Sain testified that he used his 
own "test" to determine the iodine level. 
 
In 1991, Army officials began to suspect that Sain was 
not using the quantity and quality of carbon called for in 
the contract modifications. They conducted an investigation 
which appeared to confirm their suspicions that Sain was 
using fewer than five of the 1,000-pound bags of carbon per 
tank. When confronted, Sain stated that each 1,000-pound 
bag contained 1,400 pounds. He testified to the same at 
trial, but admitted never calculating the exact weight of the 
bags. He also claimed that he had estimated how much 
volume 5,000 pounds would occupy and used that amount. 
Sain called this method "volumetric calculation." At this 
time, despite its investigation, the Army was unable to 
uncover sufficient evidence of Sain's fraud. However, on 
September 29, 1992, the Army added language to Contract 
Modification 33 which reaffirmed that payment of the 
$27,401 was contingent on Sain's use of 5,000 pounds of 
"pure, virgin activated carbon" per tank. 4 Sain signed that 
modification. 
 
On December 14, 1992, the Army withheld payment of 
$211,800 that Sain had previously claimed and requested 
that AEC account for all of the carbon purchased and 
installed at the plant. Sain told the Army's representatives 
that his attorney, Keith Baker, would provide the requested 
information. Baker supplied a letter, a summary, and 18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The modification read: 
 
       The unit pricing for the above identified claims is based on the 
       quantities (5,000 pounds) and quality (pure, virgin activated 
carbon) 
       which formed the mutual agreement in Modification Number 
       P00014. In the event the quantity and/or quality of carbon material 
       used in these carbon changes is found to be less than that upon 
       which Modification Number P00014 is based, the Government 
       reserves the right to adjust the Contract Amount to reflect such 
cost 
       difference. 
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invoices to the Army which purported to show that AEC 
had purchased and used 1,056,050 pounds of carbon. This 
matched almost exactly the amount of carbon which would 
have been used if AEC had installed 5,000 pounds per tank 
for the 212 change outs it had performed. In reliance on 
the representations in the summary submitted to it, the 
Army paid Sain much of the money he requested, reducing 
the payment for the last nine change outs to $16,409.67 
per change out because the AEC-supplied documents 
showed that AEC paid only $.72 per pound of carbon 
during this time. At trial, Sain conceded that the numbers 
Baker supplied were incorrect. The Government established 
that AEC had actually purchased only 795,818 pounds of 
carbon and 24 of the 1,000-pound bags remained unused. 
Sain claimed that the omissions and misstatements in the 
letter, summary, and supporting documents were mistakes 
and denied that he intended to defraud the Army. 
 
After an investigation, the grand jury indicted Sain and 
AEC for engaging in a scheme to defraud the Army. The 
indictment alleged that Sain and AEC falsely represented 
that only virgin carbon in 5,000-pound amounts was 
capable of properly cleaning the water. The indictment 
further alleged that AEC and Sain represented that they 
used this type and amount of carbon although oftentimes 
they were using reactivated carbon in lesser amounts and 
pocketing the difference in price. There is no dispute that 
the reactivated carbon in amounts of less than 5,000 used 
by AEC treated the waste water to the satisfaction of the 
Army and in compliance with the consent decree. 
 
III. 
 
On appeal, Sain and AEC make several arguments why 
their convictions should be reversed or sentences modified. 
We address each in turn. AEC did not file a separate brief 
and, where appropriate, has adopted Sain's arguments. 
 
A. 
 
Sain first argues that the district court erred in denying 
his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that 
the evidence did not prove that he engaged in a fraudulent 
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scheme. We address Sain's sufficiency of the evidence 
argument first because, if he is correct, we would be 
required to order the district court to enter a judgment of 
acquittal on all counts, eliminating the need to consider 
any of his other arguments. See Burks v. United States, 437 
U.S. 1, 17-18 (1977). 
 
Sain contends that his misrepresentations to the Army 
were not "material." According to Sain, regardless of what 
the documents he submitted reflected, the Army did not 
make payment of the 46 claims based on the actual 
expenses incurred in the carbon change outs. Instead, the 
Army agreed to pay AEC the fixed price of $27,401 for each 
change out over the two change outs allowed in the 
contract regardless of whether AEC used virgin or 
reactivated carbon or in what amount, as long as the plant 
properly treated the depot's waste water. Hence, Sain 
argues, because the Army received what it bargained for-- 
namely, clean waste water--and did not rely on his false 
statements, his claims were not fraudulent. 
 
Initially, we note that this court has not explicitly ruled 
that misrepresentations must be material in order to be 
actionable under the federal fraud statutes, although our 
cases strongly suggest that we would not so hold. See 
United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1244 (3d Cir. 1995) 
("The negligence of the victim in failing to discover a 
fraudulent scheme is not a defense to criminal conduct.") 
(citation omitted). We need not decide this issue because, 
as explained below, the evidence that the Army reasonably 
relied on Sain's misrepresentations is substantial. Hence, 
we leave the issue for another day. 
 
A criminal defendant seeking reversal of his conviction 
based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence bears a 
very heavy burden. Cooper, 121 F.3d at 133; Coyle, 63 F.3d 
at 1243. This Court must "affirm the convictions if a 
rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the verdict is supported by 
substantial evidence." Coyle, 63 F.3d at 1243 (citations 
omitted). If there is substantial evidence to support the 
jury's verdict, we will not reverse even though we might 
have made a different decision based on the evidence. 
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Cooper, 121 F.3d at 133; United States v. Hannigan, 27 
F.3d 890, 892 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
According to the indictment, the defendants engaged in 
the following fraudulent scheme: Sain represented to Army 
officials that the waste-water treatment plant would only 
produce sufficiently pure water if each carbon change out 
consisted of 5,000 pounds of virgin carbon per tank. Based 
on these representations, the Government agreed to 
reimburse AEC for the costs of this type of change out. The 
contract modifications provided that the Army would 
reimburse AEC for the amounts it actually spent. Sain's 
representations were false; he knew that the plant would 
operate effectively even if he used less expensive, 
reactivated carbon in amounts of fewer than 5,000 pounds. 
Most of the time, AEC used less than 5,000 pounds of less 
expensive, reactivated carbon in the change outs, with Sain 
keeping the difference between the amount he claimed he 
spent and the amount he actually spent. To execute the 
scheme, Sain made false statements in the claim forms and 
hid from the Government information that he was using 
reactivated carbon and less than 5,000 pounds per tank 
per change out. 
 
Our review of the record convinces us that there is more 
than substantial evidence supporting the Government's 
charge and establishing that Sain and AEC violatedS 1031. 
First, ample evidence establishes that Sain represented to 
the Army that 20,000 pounds of virgin carbon per change 
out must be used to treat the waste water effectively. Army 
technical representative Kinsinger and Lieutenant Colonel 
Andrews testified that Sain repeatedly told them that only 
virgin carbon would properly filter the water and that each 
tank must be filled with 5,000 pounds in order to operate 
effectively. Further, both Kinsinger and Andrews testified 
that the Army relied on Sain's representations. Contrary to 
Sain's argument, the Army required more than just the 
purification of its waste water. Each time Sain made a 
claim for expenses related to a change out, the Army 
required him to certify that he was using 20,000 pounds of 
virgin carbon per change out. Virtually all of the documents 
Sain provided to the Army purported to show that AEC 
either was using virgin carbon in 5,000-pound amounts or 
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using carbon with a price generally corresponding to the 
then-market price of virgin carbon. It would not have been 
necessary for Sain to submit such detailed documentation 
containing such representations if the Army did not care 
about the amount, type of carbon used and cost, and was 
only concerned with clean waste water. 
 
Second, the evidence establishes that the Army agreed to 
pay AEC the full amount of the claim only if AEC used 
20,000 pounds of virgin carbon per change out. According 
to Contract Modification 14, AEC was entitled to an 
adjustment of the original contract because of "costs 
associated with the excessive polluent (sic) level." Contract 
Modification 33 reaffirmed that language, providing that 
payment was predicated on AEC's using the quantity and 
quality of carbon described in Modification 14. Similarly, 
the claim forms and accompanying certifications and 
supporting documents submitted to the Army by AEC 
represented that AEC used carbon costing $1.25 per 
pound, the approximate market price of virgin carbon. If 
the contract modifications allowed AEC to recoup afixed 
amount regardless of his expenses, as Sain claims they did, 
there would have been little need to submit certifications 
and supporting documents. Further, Andrews testified that 
he advised Sain both orally and in writing that AEC would 
be reimbursed only if AEC provided sufficient evidence that 
it actually expended the money claimed. 
 
Third, Sain conceded a key aspect of the Government's 
case. He admitted that the plant operated effectively even 
though he used reactivated carbon and less than 20,000 
pounds per change out. Indeed, in his defense he 
contended that the jury should acquit him because he 
properly purified the Army's waste water and that his use 
of reactivated carbon in less than 20,000-pound lots was 
irrelevant to his arrangement with the Army. The 
effectiveness of reactivated carbon in amounts of less than 
20,000 pounds was critical to the scheme because it 
permitted Sain to pocket the price difference between the 
quality and quantity of the carbon he told the Army he was 
using and the quantity and quality he in fact used. 
 
Finally, there was substantial evidence that Sain 
submitted numerous false documents and hid from the 
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Government the truth that he was not using the quality 
and quantity of carbon that he had represented. For 
example, Sain provided to the Army Encotech invoice 326 
and an accompanying letter which falsely claimed that AEC 
had purchased carbon for the approximate market price of 
virgin carbon when in fact it did not purchase that carbon; 
caused his attorney, Keith Baker, to submit a false 
summary of carbon usage and expenditures; and made 
several other purchases of reactivated carbon from 
Encotech, all the while representing to the Army that he 
was using virgin carbon. 
 
At trial, the lynchpin of Sain's defense was that he and 
the Army negotiated a fixed price for each carbon change 
out. He claimed that he was entitled to use whatever type 
of carbon in whatever amount regardless of what the 
documents showed and the representations he made. The 
jury simply rejected Sain's characterization of his 
contracted obligations with the Army. There was 
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict in light of 
the documents, the testimony of the Government's 
witnesses, and Sain's concessions in his testimony. 
 
B. 
 
Sain next argues that his convictions should be vacated 
because the Government failed to establish that he devised 
and executed a fraudulent scheme in connection with a 
contract valued at more than the $1 million minimum 
specified in the Act. See 18 U.S.C. S 1031(a) (outlawing 
fraud in connection with government contract "if the value 
of the contract ... is $1,000,000 or more"). He argues that 
the evidence established that each of the contract 
modifications was a separate contract and distinct from the 
main contract. Thus, he claims, any fraud he may have 
committed was in connection with each of the individual 
contract modifications and not the main contract. 
According to Sain, because the contract modifications were 
valued at less than $1 million each, his fraud in connection 
with them did not violate the Act. We disagree. 
 
The Act provides: 
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       Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, 
       any scheme or artifice with the intent--(1) to defraud 
       the United States; or (2) to obtain money or property 
       by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
       representations, or promises, in any procurement or 
       property or services as a prime contractor with the 
       United States or as a subcontractor 8 if the value of 
       the contract, subcontract, or any constituent part 
       thereof, for such property or services is $1,000,000 or 
       more shall ... be fined not more than $1,000,000 or 
       imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1031(a). 
 
Sain relies on United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548 (2d 
Cir. 1993), which holds that "the value of the contract 
[under the Act] is determined by looking to the specific 
contract upon which the fraud is based." Id. at 551. In 
Nadi, the government awarded two contracts for the 
production of individual salt and pepper packets for 
American troops in the Persian Gulf. The defendants were 
hired to perform the contracts as the only subcontractor. 
Under the contracts, the government was permitted to 
terminate performance unilaterally. If performance was 
unilaterally terminated, the defendants retained the right to 
claim reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses associated 
with their performance of the contract. The defendants 
purchased extra equipment in anticipation of producing the 
salt and pepper packets. The government, however, 
exercised its right to terminate the contract and invited the 
defendants to submit a claim for their out-of-pocket 
expenses. The defendants submitted inflated and 
fraudulent claims. They were indicted and convicted of 
violating the Act. 
 
On appeal, they challenged their convictions on the 
ground that the Act was void for vagueness because it did 
not define the phrase "value of the contract." The 
government argued that, for purposes of the Act, the prime 
contract is always the contract to which the courts should 
look when determining whether the $1 million minimum is 
met even when the defendant is a party, and commits a 
fraud with respect only to a subcontract. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed. After 
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examining the legislative history, it rejected the general rule 
proferred by the government, reasoning that the contract 
on which the fraud is based is the relevant contract, 
whether it be a prime contract or a subcontract. 
 
Sain acknowledges that the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's holding in United States v. 
Brooks, 111 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1997), is to the contrary. In 
Brooks, the court held that "regardless of its privity with the 
United States, any contractor or supplier involved in a 
prime contract with the United States who commits a fraud 
... is guilty so long as the prime contract, a subcontract, a 
supply agreement, or any constituent part of such a 
contract is valued at $1 million or more." Id. at 368-69. 
 
We need not decide whether to follow Brooks or Nadi, 
because we conclude that there was only one contract in 
this case. The contract modifications pointed to by Sain 
were simply that--modifications of the approximately $4.5 
million original contract which ultimately increased in value 
to approximately $7 million. As modifications, they were not 
separate contracts and did not stand on their own; they 
merely changed some of the terms of the original contract. 
The modifications incorporated and referred back to the 
terms of the original contract, explicitly stating that that 
contract remained in effect. Each modification states that it 
is a "modification of contract/order no. DAAC89-88-C-0008 
[the original contract]," but did not reduce the 
Government's financial liability under the contract. To the 
contrary, the modifications increased the total liability to 
almost $7 million. The modifications also state that "[a]ll 
other terms and conditions in the contract remain[sic] the 
same." Thus, the jury reasonably relied on this language in 
the modifications in concluding that even though Sain used 
the modifications to defraud the Army, the fraud 
intrinsically involved the approximately $7 million contract. 
 
C. 
 
Sain next argued that the indictment improperly charged 
him with a separate violation of the Act for each false claim 
he submitted. He claims he should have been charged only 
with a single count predicated on his devising the overall 
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fraudulent scheme. Because this claim requires 
interpretation of a statute, we exercise plenary review. See 
United States v. Cross, 128 F.3d 145, 147 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
By its plain language, the statute criminalizes each 
knowing "execution" of the fraudulent scheme and not 
simply devising the fraudulent scheme itself. (Emphasis 
added). The statute's contemplation that defendants could 
be convicted of "multiple counts" supports this reading. See 
18 U.S.C. S 1031(c) (providing for a maximumfine of $10 
million for defendants convicted of "multiple counts"). Our 
reading of the statute is consistent with this and other 
circuits' interpretation of the bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 
S 1344,5 which contains language virtually identical to the 
Major Fraud Act. "The circuits that have addressed 
multiplicity in the context of bank fraud have consistently 
held that the ... statute `punishes each execution of a 
fraudulent scheme rather than each act in furtherance of 
such a scheme.' " United States v. Harris, 79 F.3d 223, 232 
(2d Cir. 1996) (collecting cases from the Third, Fifth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth circuits), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 
223 (1996); See United States v. Schwartz, 899 F.2d 243, 
248 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Rimell, 21 F.3d 281, 
287 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 
Our determination that a defendant may be punished for 
each knowing execution of the fraudulent scheme does not 
end the inquiry, however. Not every act in furtherance of a 
fraudulent scheme is a separate "execution" of the scheme. 
In determining whether an action is a separate execution of 
a fraudulent scheme, courts look to whether the actions are 
substantively and chronologically independent from the 
overall scheme. See Harris, 79 F.3d at 232. In the instant 
case, each of the 46 false claims constituted a separate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The bank fraud statute provides: 
 
       "Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or 
       artifice--(1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain 
any of 
       the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property 
       owned by, or under the custody or control of, afinancial 
institution, 
       by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
       promises; shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned 
       not more than 30 years or both." 
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execution of the scheme. Each was substantively 
independent from the overall scheme because each sought 
to obtain a separate amount of money from the government 
and caused the government a distinct loss. There is no 
evidence that the defendants had determined a specific 
amount of money that they wanted to obtain and took 
several steps to get that single amount. Rather, the 
evidence established that the defendants intended to obtain 
as much money as possible. Further, the false claims were 
chronologically distinct from each other in that each was 
submitted weeks or months apart over an approximately 
three-and-one-half-year period. In sum, we hold that a 
defendant may be separately punished under the Major 
Fraud Act for each execution of the fraudulent scheme and 
that each of Sain's false claims constituted a 
chronologically and substantially separate execution of the 
fraudulent scheme. 
 
D. 
 
Sain next argues that he cannot be convicted of violating 
the Act because the Act only permits conviction of an entity 
or individual that actually contracted with the United 
States, and AEC, not Sain, was the contracting party. The 
indictment alleged that Sain aided and abetted AEC in the 
commission of the violations of the Act. See 18 U.S.C. S 2.6 
Sain contends that he cannot be convicted under the theory 
that he aided and abetted AEC in violating the Act because 
he owned and completely controlled AEC. According to 
Sain, there is no other entity for him to aid or abet because 
his ownership and control of AEC merge him and 
corporation into a single entity. Sain relies on United States 
v. Stevens, 909 F.2d 431 (11th Cir. 1990), which holds that 
an individual agent of a corporation cannot be convicted of 
conspiracy when the only other possible party to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Section 2 provides: "(a) Whoever commits an offense against the 
United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures 
its commission, is punishable as a principal[;] (b) Whoever willfully 
causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another 
would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a 
principal." 
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conspiracy is the agent's corporation. This is a legal 
argument, and we exercise plenary review. See United 
States v. Jefferson, 88 F.3d 240, 241 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
117 U.S 536 (1996). 
 
Sain's argument is pure sophistry; its fundamental 
inconsistency is its fatal flaw. It is inconsistent because, on 
the one hand, Sain contends that AEC, because it is a 
corporation, is a separate entity that entered into the 
contract with the Army, thereby insulating him personally 
from any criminal liability for the fraud. On the other hand, 
relying on Stevens, Sain asserts that given his stock 
ownership and control of AEC, he and the corporation are 
actually the same entity and, therefore, he cannot, in 
essence, aid and abet himself. 
 
Although a corporation has certain limitations imposed 
by the particular statute permitting its creation, it is a 
separate legal entity, with an existence "independent of 
individuals who compose it." William M. Fletcher, Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations S 5, at 441 
(Permanent ed. 1990); see also Wooddale, Inc. v. Fidelity 
and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 378 F.2d. 627, 631 (8th Cir. 
1967). A corporation is not in reality a person, but the law 
regards it as "distinct and separate from the individual 
stockholders. It has a real existence with rights and 
liabilities as a separate legal entity." Fletcher S 7, at 445. 
This is true even if a single individual owns and controls all 
of the corporation's stock. See id. S 14, at 463. 
 
One of the principal reasons why individuals choose the 
corporate form is that it is a separate entity and offers 
protection from personal liability for its debts. See 
Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7 (N.Y. 1966) ("The 
law permits the incorporation of a business for the very 
purpose of enabling its proprietors to escape personal 
liability"). Like individuals, corporations may sue and be 
sued, enter into contracts, see N.J. Stat. Ann. S 14A:3-1(1) 
(listing duties and privileges of corporation); 15 Pa. Con. 
Stat. Ann. S 1502(a)(2) (same), and be separately convicted 
of and sentenced for criminal offenses. See United States v. 
Hughes Aircraft Co., Inc., 20 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 1993). 
AEC, because it is a corporation, is a separate legal entity, 
even though Sain owned all the stock. Thus, it has the 
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capacity of being aided and abetted. To hold otherwise 
would allow the controlling stockholder of a corporation to 
enjoy the benefits of the corporate form, protection from 
personal liability for corporation's debts, without accepting 
the burden of assuming criminal responsibility when the 
individual causes the corporation to commit a crime. 
Indeed, Sain, by his conduct, recognized and exploited 
AEC's existence as a separate entity; he caused AEC to sign 
the contract with the Army in order to protect himself from 
personal liability. If a corporation is permitted to perform 
the wide range of functions listed above, we see no reason 
why it cannot be used by its officers and agents to commit 
a crime as contemplated by 18 U.S.C. S 2(b). 
 
Even assuming that Sain is correct that it was impossible 
for him to conspire with AEC, that conclusion does not 
preclude imposition of aiding and abetting responsibility. 
Arguably, Sain could not conspire with AEC because AEC 
could not form the mental state required to conspire with 
another. This is because a corporation is a conspirator only 
pursuant to respondeat superior liability. If an agent of the 
corporation conspires with another individual, the 
corporation for which the individual is the agent may be 
criminally liable. However, there must be at least two 
natural individuals for a conspiracy involving a corporation 
to exist because two entities must have the required mental 
state to form a conspiracy. The aiding and abetting statute 
allows for broader liability and does not require proof that 
an unwitting entity being used to commit the crime 
possessed any mental state. See 18 U.S.C.S 2(b) ("Whoever 
willfully causes an act to be done which if directly 
performed by him or another would be an offense against 
the United States, is punishable as a principal."); see also 
United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 567 (3d Cir. 1994) ("A 
defendant charged under section 2(b) with willfully causing 
another person to file a false report, can be convicted even 
if that intermediary was unaware that the document was 
inaccurate.") (citations omitted). Only the person causing 
the unwitting entity to act must possess the knowing 
mental state. See 20 F.3d at 567. Therefore, an individual 
who causes a corporation to commit a crime is criminally 
liable for the corporation's criminal conduct as an aider and 
abettor even if the corporation does not act with a knowing 
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mental state. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 
284 (1943). For that reason, conviction of Sain was proper 
even assuming arguendo that Sain caused AEC to 
unwittingly commit the crime. Thus, the district court 
committed no error in sustaining Sain's conviction as an 
aider and abettor. 
 
E. 
 
Sain next argues that the district court erred when it 
refused to admit the testimony of defense expert Henry 
Foster, a metallurgist, on the ground that Foster's 
testimony was irrelevant and confusing. According to Sain's 
proffer, Foster would have testified that it was against 
Sain's interest to perform unnecessary carbon change outs 
because the change outs damaged the adsorbers. Foster 
also would have testified that he observed signs that carbon 
had collected on the sides of the adsorbers and had been 
scraped from that position. This second aspect of Foster's 
testimony would have rebutted the Government's 
suggestion that Sain allowed the carbon build up along the 
inside of the tanks making his calculation of the amount of 
his use of carbon based on volume inaccurate. This court 
reviews the district court's conclusion to exclude evidence 
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 
553, 571-72 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
The district court excluded the part of Foster's testimony 
dealing with Sain's disincentive to perform unnecessary 
change outs, concluding that it was not relevant and was 
misleading. The court reasoned that the Government had 
not claimed that Sain performed unnecessary change outs 
or that the type and amount of carbon that Sain used were 
ineffective. Hence, the testimony was misleading and 
irrelevant, according to the district court, because Sain was 
improperly attempting to suggest to the jury that he was 
permitted to make false claims to recoup the damages 
made to the tanks. 
 
This conclusion was not an abuse of discretion. The 
Government's theory was not that Sain used ineffective 
quantities or qualities of carbon. To the contrary, the 
Government agreed that Sain had performed the number of 
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change outs claimed, had not performed any unnecessary 
change outs, and agreed that the type and amount of 
carbon used was entirely effective in treating the waste 
water. Hence, Foster's testimony did not relate directly or 
indirectly to any issue in the case or corroborate or dispute 
any evidence or contention of the parties. The court also 
correctly ruled that the evidence had the potential to 
mislead the jury into believing that Sain was permitted to 
recoup the alleged damage to AEC's tanks by submitting 
false claims. In complicated cases such as this, where 
jurors are required to sift through hundreds or even 
thousands of documents, hear the testimony of dozens of 
witness, and consider such esoteric issues as the relative 
effectiveness of virgin and reactivated carbon or the level of 
contaminants in waste water, the district court must be 
permitted to keep the jury's attention focused on the issues 
by excluding irrelevant and even misleading evidence. 
 
As to the portion of Foster's testimony relating to his 
observation that carbon had built up on the side of the 
adsorbers and been scraped away, contrary to Sain's claim, 
the district court specifically stated several times that 
Foster would be permitted to testify as to this matter. Sain 
declined to call Foster for this purpose. Hence, the district 
court committed no error. 
 
F. 
 
Sain next argues that the district court erred when it 
determined that he inflicted losses of $597,124 on the 
United States as a result of his fraudulent scheme. He 
argues this error affected both his base offense level under 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines and the amount of 
restitution imposed. The findings of fact underlying the 
district court's determination of the loss for guidelines 
purposes are subject to review for clear error. United States 
v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1308 (3d Cir. 1996). The 
appropriateness of a particular restitution award is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. 
 
Specifically, Sain claims the district court committed two 
errors. First, he argues that the court underestimated the 
amount of carbon used in the change outs because the 
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court did not consider 25,000 pounds referred to in an AEC 
employee's affidavit submitted by Sain prior to sentencing 
and also rejected Sain's contention that the 1,000-pound 
bags of carbon, in fact, contained 1,400 pounds. Second, 
Sain contends that the court should have subtracted from 
the loss the amounts he paid for virgin carbon when he 
used virgin carbon. 
 
The district court did not err in rejecting the affidavit 
submitted by Sain, especially because the assertion in the 
affidavit regarding the 25,000 pounds was uncorroborated 
and had not been subjected to cross-examination. Instead, 
the court based its findings on much more reliable 
evidence: a government agent's testimony and the other 
evidence produced at trial. Further, the district court 
properly rejected the claim that the 1,000-pound bags 
actually contained 1,400 pounds of carbon. There was 
ample evidence introduced at trial that the bags only 
contained between 1,000 and 1,075 pounds of carbon and 
that any additional weight was water which could not 
properly be included in the calculation. For the foregoing 
reasons, the district court's findings were not clearly 
erroneous and its imposition of the restitution award was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
 
The district court also committed no error in refusing to 
give Sain credit for his occasional use of virgin carbon in 
the change outs. Indeed, the heart of the scheme charged 
and proved was that reactivated carbon worked as 
effectively as virgin carbon. Thus, there was never any need 
to use virgin carbon and Sain's representations that virgin 
carbon had to be used allowed him to charge the 
Government unnecessary sums. 
 
G. 
 
Finally, Sain challenges the district court's increase of his 
base offense level under the sentencing guidelines based on 
a finding that he possessed a special skill and used that 
skill to significantly facilitate his commission of the offense. 
See U.S.S.G. S 3B1.3. On the basis of this finding, the 
district court increased Sain's offense level by two points. 
This court reviews for clear error the district court's finding 
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that Sain possessed a special skill and used it to 
significantly facilitate the offense. See Maurello, 76 F.3d at 
1308. Relying on United States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 1110, 
1112-13 (3d Cir. 1993), Sain argues that his special skill 
did nothing more than enable him to convince the Army to 
trust him; once he gained this trust, the fraud he 
perpetrated was "garden variety." 
 
To impose this enhancement, the district court mustfind 
that: (1) the defendant possessed a special skill and (2) 
used it to significantly facilitate the commission of the 
offense. See Maurello, 76 F.3d at 1314. Here, the district 
court found that Sain possessed special skills relating to 
his education as a professional engineer, his experience 
with waste-water treatment, and his "intimate knowledge" 
of the design and workings of the AEC waste-water 
treatment plant. The court concluded that those skills gave 
credence to Sain's insistence to the Army that only virgin 
carbon and only 20,000 pounds of it per change out would 
properly treat the waste water. The court also concluded 
that Sain's skills enabled him to determine that less 
expensive carbon and less of it would still clean the waste 
water as effectively as the amounts and types described in 
the claims he submitted to the Army. 
 
There was ample credible evidence produced at trial to 
support these findings. Without those skills and 
credentials, Sain could not have gained the Army's 
confidence and convinced it to use the amounts and type of 
carbon upon which he insisted. Sain's skills and guile not 
only influenced the Army to rely on him but also deterred 
it from independently determining that less expensive and 
fewer pounds of carbon would have been equally effective. 
Indeed, the fraud was anything but garden variety. It is 
hard to imagine how anyone without a special skill would 
be capable of committing such a complex fraud as the one 
in this case. 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of the district 
court will be affirmed. 
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